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Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900080011-5

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON

Dear Allen:

The Disarmament Administration is currently undertaking a review of our policy respecting nuclear test negotiations. This review would be immeasurably aided if a special national intelligence estimate dealing with the effects of a United States resumption of nuclear testing could be prepared by early January.

Suggested terms of reference for such an estimate are enclosed. In view of the requirement for an early completion of the policy review concerning nuclear testing, it would be greatly appreciated if you could schedule the proposed estimate for USIB consideration on January 10th.

Sincerely yours,



Hugh S. Cumming, Jr.

Enclosure:

Suggested terms of reference

The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles,
Director of Central Intelligence.

 State Department review completed

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Suggested Terms of Reference

The Effect of a Renewal of Nuclear Explosions by the United States
on the Attitudes and Policies of Other Countries

For purposes of this proposed estimate, it is assumed that the United States has begun the testing of nuclear devices for the announced purposes either of weapons development and the study of weapons effects or of improvement of detection techniques, and may also have initiated use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It is further assumed that all explosions are conducted in such a way as to minimize fall-out and other known health hazards.

The estimate should consider the impact of such U.S. action on popular and governmental opinion and the degree to which various possible U.S. public information policies might affect these reactions.

The estimate should further take up the policies and courses of action that various major countries or groupings of countries might undertake as a result of the United States action.

How and to what extent would the United States action affect future arms control negotiations, including those on a nuclear test ban and other nuclear control measures?

What effect would the United States action have on free world countries' decisions regarding the initiation of independent nuclear weapons programs?

What would be the Soviet reaction? How would they assess United States motivations in resuming tests? Would they resume testing and, if so, for what probable objectives? Would they be likely to test in the atmosphere? What would be the effect on the Chinese Communist nuclear weapons program and on Soviet policy respecting this Chinese Communist program?

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles:
General Cabell:

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A copy of this letter and enclosure has
already been sent to Bob Amory for necessary
action.

[Signature]
AAB
16 Dec. 60
(DATE)

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